OSINT Forum – Week 5
For this forum, you are to answer one or more of the questions listed below. The original post must be a minimum of 250 words. Additionally, you must post two peer responses on a classmate’s original post. Responses should be a minimum of 200 words each and include direct questions.
Questions:
– How have the authors detailed the value of open sources. Discuss one or more values. Provide real-time examples to your discussion.
– Explain the importance of open source information and the intelligence cycle.
– Why should intelligence personnel who have access to classified information should not produce unclassified products on the same subjects?
– What are the downsides of open source information?
– Identify sources one can go to collect open source information. Provide details for each source identified.
Reading & Resources:
- Collecting Open Source Intelligence via Tailored Information Delivery Systems
- Producing Intelligence from Open Sources
- NATO OSINT Handbook (pages 1-35)
- The Downside of Open Source Intelligence
Student Response #1 – Nicholas
The Intelligence cycle is what drives collection from every intelligence discipline. And that is especially true with OSINT. First there must be requirements to drive the intelligence cycle. With the requirements in place, the analysts will have an idea of what they are going to collect on, when the requirements are known they will be further scrutinized by the planning and direction phase which is led by the National Security Branch (Intelligence nd, np). Once the analyst is aware of the requirements and the planning/direction has taken place, they can now collect raw information through open source. Once the analyst gathers the information, they process and exploit it into a usable form. Once the information has been sorted and placed in a workable form, the analyst will now turn the raw information into intelligence (Intelligence nd np). Last and not least, once the information is turned into intelligence it will be put in the correct format to fit their customer’s needs. This is why the intelligence cycle is very important for open source information and the analysis of this information into intelligence. The steps above are pulled from the basic intelligence cycle, while the intelligence cycle that focuses primarily on OSINT (according to NATO) only uses planning and direction, collection, processing and exploitation, searching anonymously on the web, production, and dissemination and evaluation (Kernan 2012, 15). The steps are all similar, but the steps NATO points out for OSINT is more specific to OSINT, rather than every collection effort.
Since a lot of us have spoke about deception techniques and some of the flaws involved with OSINT, I figured I’d also add in some opinions/information about the downsides of open source information. Although OSINT is viewed valuable in most cases, reliability issues arise from proliferation on individual cites that produce propaganda, misinformation, or disinformation (Hulnick 2002, 568). The argument can be made about other INT’s having reliability issues, but the fact remains that Open Source information can be printed or spoke about by anyone. With SIGINT, an individual might be targeted for a reason and the only reliability with SIGINT in this realm is if the individual is aware of the situation and alters what he/she is saying. So, what this says is every intelligence discipline will have downsides, but it’s how the analyst recognizes the downsides and works around them.
References:
“Intelligence Cycle.” FBI.gov. Accessed 2 November 2014. http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/intelligence/intelligence-cycle.
Hulnick, Arthur S. 2002. “The Downside of Open Source Intelligence.” International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence.
Kernan, W.F. November 2001. “NATO Open Source Intelligence Handbook.”
Student Response #2 – Dwayne
What are the downsides of open source information?
It has been widely noted throughout the last 60 years or so that open source intelligence (OSINT) aids in providing the bulk of information used by the intelligence community. Some regard it as the “bread and butter” of analysis, serving as the basis from which other intelligence is then sought. While having been increasingly used, this method of intelligence collection is not without its drawbacks, as is the case with any of the “int’s”.
Perhaps the largest challenge is sorting through the mountains of open source information in search of usable information to refine into intelligence. Hulnick says that “The conventional wisdom suggests that the greatest problem is the excess of OSINT now overwhelming the ability of analysts to sort through it. This pressure, though not new, has been exacerbated by the proliferation of open source data in recent years” (Hulnick, 2002, 566). More and more websites are being developed every year that release or track possibly usable information. Technology has had to try and keep pace with the exponential increase in OSINT targets, which is no small matter.
Another major concern about OSINT is that it is unreliable. This is not a new concern, nor is it limited to OSINT. All intelligence sources must be thoroughly vetted for reliability before they become an asset. This applies to OSINT sources just the same. Through experience and comparison, OSINT sources can be screened for reliability, bias and propaganda by the analysts, particularly the seasoned veterans.
OSINT, historically, has also been proven to be used as a conduit for deception and disinformation campaigns by US adversaries – and also the US themselves. Knowing that OSINT is susceptible to being exploited in that manner, it further reinforces the idea that the seasoned analysts must be weary and closely scrutinize subject matter.
Resource:
Hulnick, A. 2002. The downside of open source intelligence. International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence. 15:565-579. Retrieved from https://edge.apus.edu/access/content/group/security-and-global-studies-common/Intelligence%20Studies/INTL%20422/Content/Week%205/The%20Downside%20of%20Open%20Source%20Intelligence_Hulnick.pdf
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