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  • Answerallofthem   1.  Suppose  thatarisk-averse  individual  hasawealth  levelWo .  This  indi- vidual  hastheoption  ofinvesting  intherisk-freeassetwithareturnof   (1+rf)                                                        (1)     There  isano

Answerallofthem   1.  Suppose  thatarisk-averse  individual  hasawealth  levelWo .  This  indi- vidual  hastheoption  ofinvesting  intherisk-freeassetwithareturnof   (1+rf)                                                        (1)     There  isano

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Answerallofthem

 

1.  Suppose  thatarisk-averse  individual  hasawealth  levelWo .  This  indi- vidual  hastheoption  ofinvesting  intherisk-freeassetwithareturnof

 

(1+rf)                                                        (1)

 

 

There  isanotherassetthatisriskywithareturnof(1+rh )inagoodstate withprobability1  and(1+rl )inabadstate  withprobability1.Theexpected


2

returnfromtheriskyassetis:

 

1

2


 

 

 

(1+rl )+


2

 

 

1

2 (1+rh )                                             (2)


 

Weassumethattheexpected  returnontheriskyassetishigher:


 

1

2 (1+rl )+


 

1

2 (1+rh )    >  (1+rf)                                (3)

1        1


2 rl+2 rh    >  rf                                            (4)

 

(a)  Showthatarisk-averse  person  willalways  invest  someamount  inthe riskyasset.

(b)What  willbetheamountinvested  intheriskyassetif1rl+1rh=rf?

2            2

2.   Consider  thefollowingPrisoner’s  dilemma  gameplayed  simultaneously:

 

 

 

 

NC(2)

C(2)

NC(1)

-2,-2

-10,-1

C(1)

-1,-10

-5,-5

 

 

Thefirstpayoffisthatofplayer  1andthesecondthatofplayer  2. Ifplayer  1movesfirstorweareinasequential  gamenow.

(a)What  isnormal  formofthegameinthesequentialversion? (b)What  aretheNashEquilibriainthesequential  version?

(c)Drawtheextensive  forminthesequential  version.

(d)What  isthesubgame  perfectNashEquilibriuminthesequential  ver- sion?

(e)Explain  whyitisthesubgameperfectNashEquilibriuminthesequen- tialversion?

3.Consider  thecostfunction  ofafirmforLRis:

 

C(q)=q320q2+110q                                     (5)

 

andthedemand  curveofthemarket  is:

 

 

QD=3,000−3P                                           (6)


 

 

 

 

 

(a)What  istheLRequilibrium  PandQ? (b)Howmany  firmswillexistintheLR?

4.Consider  twoindividuals  aandbwiththeutility  functions:

 

Ua       (xc).5(yc).5                                                    (7)

a        a

Ub      (xc).25(yc).75                                                 (8)

b             b

 

(xc,yc )aretheamountthatconsumersconsume.  Inordertopurchase  these

i     i

bundles,  theymustalsohavesomething  tosell.Inthiseconomy,theproduction

of goodshasalready  taken  place.  Eachconsumerhasthefollowingendowments ofgoods:

 

Ea     (xe,ye)=(500,500)                                       (9)

a     a

Eb      :     (xe,ye)=(200,800)                                    (10)

b       b

 

Theseendowmentscanbesoldinthe  market.The  total  amountofendow- mentsintheeconomycanbeexpressed  as:

 

X    =  xe  +xe  =700                                          (11)

a       b

Y      =  ye+ye  =1300                                         (12)

a       b

 


 

 

 

 

as:


(a)Find  theequilibrium  demand  forgoodX. (b)What  istheequilibrium   Px ?

P

 

y

[Hint:  Ifpricesofgoodsare:  Px ,Py,thebudget  constraintscanbewritten


 


Ia    =  Px xe  +Pyye


(13)


a            a


Ib     Px xe  +Pyye


(14)


b                  b

 

]

5.Consider  themarketdemand  curvetobe:

 

P=1000−Q                                                 (15) Thecostfunctionofafirmtobe:

C(q)=10q+q2                                                                    (16)

 

(a)What  isthemonopolyoutput?

 

(b)What  istheoutputforperfectly  discriminatingmonopolist? (b)What  istheCournotoutputifthere  are2firms?

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